Towards an Ontological Understanding of the Existence of the Personal Identity as the Self by Means of the Function of Thinking

Summary

This essay seeks to unpack the Cartesian cogito, demonstrating that within it lie the conditions of existence for the subjective personal identity as the self in virtue of the function of the thinking of that self.  The flow of the argument is such that it begins with an explication of the concurrency and primacy of existence in relation to essence, then delineates further between existence and essence.  It then proceeds to demonstrate the absolute nature of existence, indicating that an essence either is or is not.  Then, it flows into a discussion about the existence of subjective personal identity in light of the function of the function of thinking, and makes a case for the identification of that subjective personal identity as a “thinking thing” as well as a “functioning thing” and a “personal thing.”  Therefrom, the argument concludes with an assertion based upon the previous points made that the self is also identified as a “thinking, functioning, personal thing,” as such is the essence of the cogito “thinking thing” that the “I” that I am is.  Thus, the Cartesian cogito is thereby established in these terms.

Introduction

Descartes famously—or, perhaps, infamously—writes, “I think, therefore I am” (Descartes 18), thereby seeming to indicate that the function of thinking presupposes the conditions for subjective personal identity and with those conditions the existence of that identity as the self.  Indeed, to say that “I think, therefore I am” is very much like saying, “Thinking, I am,” seeming to indicate that the function of thinking were the evidence, not the precondition, of the existence of that “thinking thing”¹ that the “I” that I am is: to assert the contrary, that the given statement indicates that the function of thinking is the precondition of existence, is to misconstrue the statement as well as its meaning.  For as Descartes writes, “[F]rom the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed very evidently and very certainly that I existed; whereas, on the other hand, had I simply stopped thinking…I would have had no reason to believe that I had existed” (Descartes 18-19).  Again, Descartes writes, “I see very clearly that, in order to think, it is necessary to exist” (19).  Thus, existence is the precondition for the function of thinking.

Conditions of Existence and Essence

We might trace the line of being ²from the function of thinking back toward existence, since for the function of thinking to occur it must needs presuppose some thing that is functioning in terms of thinking (namely, a “thinking thing”), which is possessed of by an essence, which must needs exist.  The existence of the “thinking thing” is logically prior to the essence of the “thinking thing,” since for some thing to be it must logically first exist.  It may seem to be a trivial point to note that existence precedes essence, but it seems necessary to do so, as it has been before controverted and traditionally established in terms of the contrary.³  While existence may be concurrent with essence, it is logically prior to essence, since existence is the realm in which reality has its abode, in which all essences abound. 

To be sure, essence and existence are concurrent in that they occur together, as when a thing, which also is made up of the essence by which it is defined, is, existence is therewith it.  Indeed, as an essence is, therewith it is the existence thereof, for no thing might be—without the existence of that thing; and while a thing, as an essence, might not be without existence, existence in itself might simply be or obtain without any object therewith (to which we shall attend shortly).  Indeed, everything has an essence.⁴  For example, an object, as a rock, essentially might obtain as “rock-like” or “stoney,” and where it does not obtain thus in its essence, it does not exist.  Or, take a lump of wax, for example: it may be formed as a candle or decorative ball or statue, but it retains its essential essence throughout of “wax-ness.”  Essence, however, obtains in virtue of another, namely, existence.

Conversely, existence might obtain in and of itself in this way: the state of being might be in a world without any objects, though we might not be able to fully comprehend such a world, as we live in a very material world, comprised of matter and so think generally in terms of matter.  If, however, we were to imagine a world in which no thing (of matter or otherwise) existed, but only existence itself, we might imagine an empty world, devoid of objects, whether material or immaterial, wherein no thing but existence is.  Existence in itself is a reality unknown to us in terms of our common conceptions of reality, since we live and move in a reality of existence wherein essence and objects thereof abound, even as an essence is within each of us.  Still, a reality without any contingent essence(s) must needs be.  This might be shown better by demonstrating that existence is logically prior to essence.

Indeed, that existence is logically prior to essence might be demonstrated in this way: existence is the precondition of essence because all that which is is contingent, inasmuch as it might not be or might not have been.  Seeing as how there are now many and various things, which are seemingly comprised of many and various essences, there must needs be some cause of all these contingent things, which must logically and necessarily precede that which proceeds from it, that cause being itself possibly necessary and necessarily existent, which might be named as existence qua existence, pure existence, the fundamental principle of reality itself (cf. Aquinas, Summa, Q2A3).  This seems to indicate that existence is the non-contingent cause of the essence(s) of reality.

Moreover, the primacy of existence might be known thus: as an object, having an essence, cannot be without therewith or first being, so existence is prior to essence, which is the substance (loosely defined) of the given object.  As such, existence is the primary state of reality, the underlying principle that inheres in all things and all essences thereof.  That is not to say that existence is necessarily some thing in itself, but is merely the logically prior cause of all things, whatever it might be in itself, if it is even anything in itself.  To be sure, existence is that which inheres within or about (an) essence, though distinct from (any) essence, being that which underlies all essences that are in the realm of reality.

Furthermore, while existence inheres within essence, it might be delineated as distinct from essence, in that existence inheres within more than one essence and is the means by which all that is is.  This might also be shown in this way: as color inheres in an object, so that the object is not color in itself, neither is color what the object is in itself, as color is a property that inheres within an object and the object is a retainer of that color; in a very similar way, as existence inheres in essence, so existence is not essence in itself, neither is essence existence in itself.  Rather, existence is an instantiated and essential “property,”⁵ as it were, of essence, and essence is the retainer of existence.  

Or again, for example, as the number one is prior to and distinct from any other number, as, say, the number two, so, in a slightly similar way, existence is prior to and distinct from essence.  Additionally, inasmuch as the number one is a number, so “number-ness”—the essential essence of being a number—is prior to and distinct from the number one.  In a very much similar way to this is existence prior to and distinct from essence.  Thus, the division between existence and essence might be known.  

At this point, I will further distinguish between essence and existence, describing each in terms of some definitions that I hope prove to be helpful.  As I hope has been heretofore shown, existence is non-contingent, the cause of the essence of reality, and the instantiated and essential property of the essence of reality.  The non-contingency or necessity of existence is such that it obtains prior to any thing else, being that which supports and sustains all else.  The causal nature of existence is such that it produces that which comes of it, of whatever means it might do so, being that which brings about all else, which, though being supported and sustained by it, that is, being of it, is not it, but is an effect of it.  The nature of existence such that it is the instantiated and essential property of the essence of reality is such it must needs hold together the thing it causes and therewith be essentially instantiated within that thing or essence, of the cause thereof.  In short, existence is the state or cause or property of obtaining or realizing (of some thing) in the realm of reality, whether it is of the material or immaterial, as an object or idea, respectively.

Regarding essence, it, as heretofore I hope has been shown, is contingent, an effect of the cause of existence, and a retainer, as it were, of existence.  The contingency of essence might be demonstrated thus, in that all that which is might not be, even as all that which is has some beginning, of which some cause must be, making essence the effect of that cause, which is existence.  Furthermore, essence is a retainer, as it were, of the instantiated and essential property of existence, being that which holds existence in itself, even as existence holds it together.  In short, essence is a thing, as it were, as a (pure and simple) substance or a property or aggregate thereof, whether material or immaterial, as an object or idea.  

Regarding properties and substances, though they might comprise or account for (the appearance or presence or experience of) an essence, they do not thereby cause the essence, for existence is its cause.  Properties or substances are those aspects or features of an object of an essence that determine both quality as well as quantity of the given object of an essence.  They are the means by which the essence materializes or realizes its manifestation in the realm of reality.

Though existence is concurrent with essence, it is also apart and distinct from essence, as essence is necessarily contingent, being a direct result of the cause of existence, which is necessarily non-contingent and possibly necessary.  Existence, indeed, is the efficient cause of essence (as well as the various and manifold kinds or types of essence), being the means by which essence comes, in that essence of necessity logically presupposes its own existence.  In short, essence is an object of reality, whereas existence is the efficient and sustaining cause of reality, being the fundamental principle of reality itself.  Reality is simply that which is in fact or in the realm of the real (even, possibly, including what is non-real or speculative or counterfactual).

To Be or Not to Be

Additionally, in regard to existence, a thing either is or is not: there is no construal of existence across a spectrum of degrees, for to state that something is becoming is to thereby admit that it is, as one does not come nigh unto existence without also therewith existing, though it may be in a state of immaturity: it manifests in existence, regardless of its degree of maturation.  Plainly, a thing is, even if not fully formed or if transitioning from one state to another state: overall, a thing is in the state of existence in the realm of reality, and does not go in and out of existence, else it would either not be and then be or it would be and then not be—but this is absurd, as of nothing comes nothing and of something comes something.  Indeed, as the laws of the conservation of energy and of mass indicate, nothing new might be introduced naturally into the realm of reality nor might anything in that realm be destroyed; thus, is all that which is maintained: of nothing comes nothing and of something comes something, as energy or mass are transferred, but never created nor destroyed.

All that which has been aforementioned in this essay applies here in that either I am or I am not; seeing as I am in virtue of the evidence of the thought or thoughts that I am having, existence is the basis for that existence in which I am.  Thus, to state, “I think, therefore I am” is to state as much that in the function of thinking, one, such as the “I” that I am, functions in the function of thinking, in light of the essence that upholds that function of thinking, which is upheld by the existence in which that one, the “I” that I am, exists.  “I” am, then, in light of the existence that upholds the essence of the “I” that I am, thus demonstrated by the function of the function of thinking that I am in the midst of doing.  As such, I am a “thinking thing.”

A “Thinking Thing”

However, whether “I” exist as a “thinking thing” has been a matter of some contention (cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 414-5; Slezak, 2010; among others), but it might possibly be cleared up with the following thought experiment.  Suppose that thoughts are being had by some thing and that “I” am the thing having those thoughts.  Suppose further that those thoughts are not of (in that the thoughts do not originate with) that thing, but have been placed into it by means of another.  Now, would the thoughts being had by that thing, which are not of (or do not originate with) that thing, be the thoughts of (in that the thoughts would be possessed by) that thing?  Indeed, they would not, insofar as those thoughts did not originate with that thing; however, they would, for insofar as something is of a thing (in the sense that it is possessed by, even if not originating with, that thing), then the something is of (that is, possessed by) that thing.  Thus, if a thing, as “I,” might be having thoughts, though the thoughts were not originating with the “I,” the thoughts are no less a part of the “I” than if they had originated with the “I”: the thoughts indeed are still being had by the “I”; and, insofar as the “I” is possessing those thoughts, it is in the function of thinking those thoughts, thereby being the subject of those thoughts.

If “I” as a “thinking thing” do, in fact, exist as a subject of thoughts, then so does such an identity therewith also exist, namely, a subjective personal identity.  This is not only because trivially the term with which I identify the “I” is the personal pronoun of “I,” which is to say that “I” exist as a person with an identity as such; it is also more significantly because I am not only a “thinking thing” but also a “functioning thing,” the function of which indicates that I am to be identified in accordance with the function thereof, as a thing might be, and seems often rather to be, identified with its function (cf. Korsgaard, Aristotle’s Function Argument, 138).  Since I function as a “thinking thing” as well as a subject of the thoughts had by this “thinking thing,” I seem to therewith also possess a subjective personal identity as a “thinking thing,” which is to say that “I” am a person.

The Personal Pronominal “I”

This indicates that, insofar as “I” am concerned, personal identity is the essence of the “thinking thing” that I am, for of what other identity would “I” be, if not a personal one, being the subject that “I” am?  Again, the pronominal designator “I” indicates an identification of a personal kind, such that I am a person.  Moreover, I am a subject that is a “thinking thing” inasmuch as I am my own person, such being the indicator of my own identity.  Now, the relation between my personal identity and my essence is thus: as I am but a “thinking thing,” the essence thereof must needs be located within that “thinking thing” that I am and the thoughts of which I am the subject.  Personal identity, then, is my essence, and therewith is my existence, of which comes function.  

Function is the operation of the “thinking thing” that I am.  It might be defined as the means by which one operates or acts (loosely defined) as well as the reason or purpose for which one does so.  For the purposes of this essay, however, I shall limit “function” to the means by which one, such as “I,” operates or acts.  As a “thinking thing,” I function or operate, that is, act in terms of thinking; not only that, as I am thinking, in that I am a “thinking thing,” so I am functioning, and, thereby, am a “functioning thing.”

The manner in which the function of thinking interrelates with my essence, such as my personal identity, is thus: the function of the “thinking thing” that I am presupposes essence, which is my own personal identity, since that of which I am is my own with which I identify and since I am a person; thus, I am not only a “thinking thing” or a “functioning thing,” but I am also a “personal thing,” such that I not only function as such but am as such.  This personal identity, too, presupposes my existence.  Thus, function, in virtue of the property of transitivity, is grounded in or a function of existence.  For in order for some function to be, it must needs be a function of some thing of an essence, and for an essence to be, it must, of course, exist, in accordance with the underlying principle of reality.  

This underlying principle of reality, which causes all, is, as aforementioned, existence—insofar as our minds are able to comprehend.  For to imagine reality as anything else, like nonexistence, is to imagine nothing nigh unto comprehension but a mere vain imagination of some nonsense predicated by nonsense; indeed, it is to imagine nothingness.  While one might imagine some comprehension of the conception of nothingness or nonexistence, no one is able to actually grasp nonexistence or nothingness because neither ever obtains, even in the imagination: what does obtain that might appear to be an empty state of being is a counterfactual existence. While a counterfactual existence may obtain, nonexistence, by its very definition, may not obtain—indeed, it cannot obtain: either one exists or one does not exist.  Again, the very reason that the underlying principle or state of reality is existence is that all that is is in virtue of another, the latter being that which is the efficient cause of the former; and as all that which is now is contingent, as it could have not been, there necessarily must needs be some non-contingency that holds, which is the cause of all things, which is, namely, existence itself.

Consider the Imagination

What of the imagination, though, wherefrom come so many things which did not seemingly exist but do now?  What of those imaginings, ideas, or thoughts, those mental states that simply come into our minds, seeming to “pop” into existence, and then are as good as gone the very next moment?  Indeed—what of the imagination?  What does it demonstrate but that that which will at some time be in the material world originates in the germination of a thought in the imagination of the mind?  It merely tells wherefrom something comes—neither shedding light upon the state of nonexistence nor that of existence in degrees: for either a thought in the imagination is or it is not, and if it is, it may well flourish to become something beyond the imagination in the realm of the material, but that it is in the realm of the mind and not in the material realm does not thereby denigrate (its) existence unto a continuum of degrees of becoming nor exonerate nonexistence as a thing to be considered in fact, but only demonstrates that a thing either is—as at its inception—or is not, which is to say that it has no inception and no beginning and thus no existence.  Indeed, as the laws of physics seem to indicate, matter and energy are one and the same, on a spectrum, as it were (cf. Flores, Einstein’s 1935 Derivation of E=mc²): perhaps, thoughts are but the energy of the matter of the brain, supervening upon the brain and its physical states, not simply “popping” into existence from nowhere.

Conclusion

Therefore, I am a “thinking thing,” a “functioning thing,” and a “personal thing,” being the subject of the thoughts that I am having.  To state, “I think, therefore I am,” is to state as much that the function of thinking presupposes the existence of a personal identity of the “I” as such.  Still, what of the identity of the self?  It lies within the subjective personal nature of the “thinking, functioning, personal thing” that “I” am in virtue of the essence thereof, being upheld and sustained by the existence thereof.

1. Descartes writes of the “thinking thing” in his Meditations on First Philosophy, stating, “I was aware of absolutely nothing that I knew belonged to my essence, save that I was a thinking thing, that is, a thing having within itself the faculty of thinking” (51). ↩︎
2. For the purposes of this essay, I shall loosely define “existence” and “being” as one and the same and so shall use the terms interchangeably throughout, not distinguishing between these two concepts herein. ↩︎
3. Though Sartre asserts as much that existence precedes essence (Existentialism is a Humanism, 22), overturning the long established tradition of the primacy of essence to existence (cf. Sartre 21-22; Aquinas, On Being and Essence, Chapter 1), I do not wish to align myself with his line of thinking in asserting the same statement or idea as he.  Rather, by indicating that existence precedes essence, I mean to say not that man is and so makes his identity, his essence, of his existence, but that metaphysically, that is, ontologically, existence is the prime state or cause of essence, of which comes function and therewith identity. ↩︎
4. Now, even existence has an essence.  As shall be shown later on, existence is not contingent; likewise, the essence of existence is not contingent, but is the one essence that necessarily is, since existence is necessary.  What the essence of existence is is like unto what will be shown regarding existence: the non-contingent or necessary cause that essentially instantiates in caused essences as a property thereof.  That existence should, too, have an essence, even as essence is an essence in or unto itself makes sense in light of the fact that like causes like and of something comes something.  That being said, however, existence is still logically primary, even to its own essence, since existence, as shall be shown, is necessarily prior or primary in relation to essence. ↩︎
5. The nature of existence as a property might be such that existence can be instantiated as a property of (an) essence, in that when existence manifests in an instance, existence takes on a form that is realized within or by the essence, such that the interrelation between existence and essence might be somewhat akin to the chemical production of salt from the admixture of sodium and chlorine. ↩︎