Thesis statement:
The existence of evil presupposes the existence of God.
If is-ness is, then is-not-ness is as a corollary of the correlative relation obtaining between contraries. For if this is, then it is not, of course, that which it is not, being positively that which it is, which might be accorded as its is-ness and its contrary as its is-not-ness.
Correlatively:
If evil is, then that which is not evil is.
That which is not evil—which is that which is—is anything on the spectrum from the morally neutral to the good.
Therefore:
If evil exists, then good exists.
If good exists, then a continuum of good exists.
If a continuum of good exists, then an ultimate good exists.
If an ultimate good exists, then the good exists.
If the good exists, then God exists.
Evil exists.
Therefore, God exists.
Evil is a quality.
There can be a quality of a quantity, but there cannot be a quantity of a quality.
The existence of evil is a kind or quality of existence, such that the existence is evil, or, to put it another way, bad, ill, broken, depraved, void, absent, retarded.
Preface:
The purpose of this paper is to argue for the existence of God by arguing that the existence of evil presupposes the existence of God, which if it (the existence of God) obtains, would imply God. Indeed, the term “God,” though merely positing a positive conception of God, affirms a profound conceptually possible reality about existence, namely, the origin or source or being of existence, as I conceive it. If the existence of God obtains, then there might be some kind of answer to the origin of life, there might be some purpose for existence. I know centuries of theologians and believers have held onto such hope, but I wish to discover anew the profound reality that they have embraced, in hopes that, as any religious thinker, I might provide an argument from evil for the existence of God, that is logically sound and rationally coherent as well as valid.
While the problem of evil has been divided into the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil, I hope to unite the two into one, positing that whether evil is a logical problem or an evidential one, in either case—indeed, in any case—the existence of evil presupposes the existence of God. On the face of it, I understand that such a position appears ludicrous and absurd, as the general assertion is that God and evil cannot or should not coexist.
Though the possibility of the coexistence of God and evil has been shown to be logically valid by some philosophers as Plantinga, who argues along the lines of a freewill defense, or Hick, who argues that evil is a means unto the end of spiritual growth and health, I do not wish to argue along such lines, for I find them inadequate. Along with Mackie, I ask, if God could create agents, as human beings, who could at times choose the right, then why could or would he not create them to always choose the right? Theologically and by faith, I believe that God has some sovereign will whereby he is seeking to recreate what he created, even continuing to create what he originally created, forming it to become more fully what he originally intended all along. Philosophically, however, I do not comprehend the will of God, for he seems to contradict himself, to want free beings (Genesis 2:16-17, wherein God presents Adam with a choice between every tree in the Garden of Eden and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil) and yet not want free beings (Genesis 6:5-6, wherein God is “sorry” he created humankind because all they ever chose was evil). Again, God seems to be cruel, if by means of heinous evil, he is forming and shaping humankind and all creation to become like something he originally intended. Or, again, if some process is necessarily involved in the creation of humankind and all creation, which involves evil along the way, how could not a sovereign and omnipotent God bypass, as it were, all the evil along the way, however “necessary” such evil might be?
To be sure, as the Apostle Paul affirms in Romans 8:28, God works everything together for the good—though it be of those who love him. And as God reveals himself to Moses in Exodus 34:6-7, God is merciful and gracious, loving and faithful, forgiving inquiry, but by no means clearing the guilty and visiting the inquiry of the fathers on the children and the children’s children, to the third and the fourth generation—presumably, God loves those who love him. And yet, Ezekiel declares that God is not willing that even the wicked should perish (Ezekiel 18:23). Then, if God is not willing for the wicked to perish, but for them to repent and live, and if God is love (1 John 4:8b), and if love seeks the best for all, that is, it is good, such that it would seek to eliminate all evil as soon as possible, if not right away, why did such a good God of love create a world wherein evil was either necessary or foreseen? If God is love and is good (Exodus 33:19, wherein God says that he will cause his “goodness” to pass before Moses, which God interprets in Exodus 34:6-7), such that he cannot stand evil and eliminates evil, then why or how is there even a smidgen of evil in all this world? And whence does evil come, if God is so good?
These queries, I confess, plague my mind. My faith, however, is not founded on doubt, but is thereby strengthened. My philosophical inquiry, however, is intrigued by all such doubts: it seems apparent that evil exists, that it is in the world—and, simultaneously, it seems, by faith, at least, that a good God exists and created this world, in which there is evil. How, I wonder, philosophically, can these abide, if not by means of the avenues taken by the likes of Plantinga or Hick? I here but hope to add to the philosophical literature on the problem of evil in such a way as to provide a different way of thinking about it altogether. My simple perspective is that evil, while not impugning the character of God or negating his existence, actually, in fact, presupposes both the character of God as good and the existence of God as obtaining. I hope that my small contribution to the conversation might stand to be of some merit in the world of religious philosophy.
Finally, the argument:
- If the existence of evil obtains, then its existence presupposes the existence of good.
- If the existence of good obtains, then its existence presupposes the existence of a continuum of good.
- If the existence of a continuum of good obtains, then its existence presupposes the existence of an ultimate good, the good.
- If the existence of an ultimate good, the good, obtains, then its existence presupposes the existence of God.
- The existence of evil obtains.
- The existence of good obtains.
- The existence of a continuum of good obtains.
- The existence of an ultimate good, the good, obtains.
- The existence of the good presupposes the existence of God.
- Therefore, the existence of evil presupposes the existence of God.
Thesis statement:
The existence of evil presupposes the existence of God.
Setting the scene:
The world in which we live is, I think it safe to say, chockfull of evil. Not many would deny it, though there are some, perhaps, a growing trend. Evil might be construed as either natural or moral. Natural evil is whatsoever bad event of nature might befall some unfortunate being, as a dainty little fawn in a forest caught in the midst of a huge wildfire and doomed to die a slow and torturous death. Moral evil is whatsoever bad event might be caused by some moral agent, namely, a human being, by either deliberate action or inaction or by sheer negligence. To state the case, if God exists, how is there any such thing as evil, whether moral or natural? Indeed, if God be good and powerful, how could there be evil, if he not be the cause of it, as all things come from him and are to him?
I shall argue that God, by definition, is wholly good and wholly omnipotent, and that the existence of evil presupposes such a being. I shall not argue what I have heard before, that God and evil are compatible, insofar as God had some aim to create a world wherein agents could and would freely choose, whether for good or for evil. Personally, I do not think that the free-will defense is much of a defense of God (as if he needed defending), since it seems a poor excuse, in my view, for all the suffering, pain, and evil wrecked upon us and our world. Indeed, even under the Christian conception, I find it difficult to adjudicate how God, in all his wisdom, would foresee the suffering of his Son as an amenable and worthy plan of salvation of mankind. And though I do understand evil, suffering, and pain as a means to the end of some kind of soul-making theodicy, I see such as a secondary backup plan, not a primary plan of great worth.
Preliminary remarks:
The precondition for the existence of evil is the existence of good: if there were no good, there would be no evil. That is not to say that without evil, there would be no good: it is merely to say that good is wheresoever there is evil, necessarily; though evil is not necessarily wheresoever there is good. Good and evil do not stand in a coequal, correlative relation, but, rather, in a relation of imbalance (though not an inverse relation), evil parasitically preying upon good for its very existence, evil being conceived of as either or both an actual presence of evil, as a parasite of good, or/and an absence of good, as a shadow or void of good. In either case, evil presupposes good, of which God is the highest and most excellent kind, the fundamental principle of reality, such that he truly is the good.
Existence as good and as the good
[Now, existence is a state of being and evil is a quality of existence. As there can only be a quality of a quantity, but there cannot be a quantity of a quality, so evil, as a quality, can only be such of a quantity, but cannot, in itself, be a quantity. Good, on the other hand, might actually be a quantity, since it, though being a quality of existence, is itself also a state as well as the state of existence. For the fundamental principle of reality is existence and the base of existence is goodness.]
To consider the basic nature of existence, consider the state of affairs obtaining wherein there is nonexistence, that is, nothing. While one might imagine some comprehension of the conception of such, no one is able to actually grasp nonexistence or nothingness because it does not ever obtain: what does obtain that might appear to be a nihilistic state of being is counterfactual existence. While a counterfactual existence may obtain, nonexistence, by its very definition, may not obtain—indeed, it cannot obtain: either one exists or one does not exist. (The construal of existence as being comprised of degrees, I will not address, at this point.)
Now, if being is the only game in town, it might be construed as one of three kinds of states: good, neutral, or evil. To conceive of existence as fundamentally evil, we must firstly conceive of evil, of which I see two options that lie before us: either evil is an absence of that which is or evil is a presence of that which is, but only so as a parasite. If evil is conceived as an absence of that which is, then it would be that which is not; then, evil would be that which is not of that which is, meaning, evil would be nothing. Yet of nothing comes nothing and, at present, we perceive something, even if it be only a mental construct. Indeed, if evil is an absence of that which is, then it cannot be the fundamental principle of reality, which is existence.
If evil is conceived as a real presence, being, though, but a parasite upon that which is, we must ask: which comes first, the parasite or the host? Indeed, without the host, there would be no parasite, so it stands to reason that the parasite follows the host. Thus, evil as a parasite cannot be the fundamental principle of reality. Then, again, perhaps, evil is not so much a parasite, as it is but a force, as a force of friction, retarding that which is in its being. Still, a retarding force, as a force of friction, is preconditioned by that upon which the force acts, namely, whatsoever that which is. So, if evil were but a force, as of friction, it would not, and could not, be the fundamental principle of reality, but would/could only be a secondary principle of reality.
Now, then, if evil cannot or is not the basic quality of the fundamental principle of reality, which is existence, perhaps, moral neutrality is the basic quality of existence. Let us reason this out, then: if moral neutrality were the basic quality of existence, then there should be no moral objects or facts, whatsoever, neither in the substance of reality nor in that of the mind, for if there were even one moral object or fact, it would implicate reality with morality. Let us see if there is any way in which to account for a neutral reality, namely, such a one wherein that which is simply is that which is: there would be no need for morality, since, indeed, there would be no morality.
I consider such a reality to be thus: neither death nor life is of any value, for morality evaluates these and determines the positive or negative value of these. Indeed, whatsoever might stand between death and life would, too, be completely valueless, as morality assigns value to anything that is. But, we are opting now for a valueless reality, a world wherein there is no such thing as value, no such thing as evaluations, estimations, judgments, or the like. Even the mottos “Survival of the fittest” or “Kill or be killed” would hold no meaning, for neither action nor inaction would be of any value. The basic whim of a being, too, could not be, for a whim implies a will, even if a weak will. In a valueless, amoral reality, there cannot be intention, will, desire, or the like, not even meaning or understanding—only mechanistic instincts would be possible, but none of it would be meaningful in any way whatsoever. In such a world, personal agents as ourselves, that is, human beings, could not exist. Yet, here we are.
Now, if prime existence is neither evil nor neutral, even not amoral, then we are left with the option of goodness as being the basic quality of prime existence. If existence is basically good, how do we account for evil? However, before we dive into that query, let us account for the basic goodness of prime existence. If that which is is in virtue of that which is and evil is that which is not or that against that which is and there is no ground for moral neutrality or amorality, in this world, then that which is must needs be good. That which is, too, must needs be of such a kind or quality as to be causative of itself; it must needs be self-generative, so as to cause itself to be, else there would be no being. All that which is shares in the existence of prime existence, each bearing in itself a substance of the qualia of being, at least, we, humans, do.
As some uncaused cause must ultimately be the solitary cause of a chain of causes, there must needs be some ultimate being, from which all other being and/or beings come; that being is not necessarily God, but is necessarily one. This, then, brings up the problem of the one and the many: if the ultimate cause of all being is but one, how might we account for the many deriving of it? Indeed, how is the ultimate but one? Why is it not, rather, many?
I think that the following line of reasoning might suffice: if there are many which derive of the one, there must needs be therein the one a diversity that allows for the many to come forth from the one. Differentiation of the one unto the many might be a means whereby the many come forth from the one, with differentiation being understood as a kind of fission of the one unto the many. The singularity of the one is necessary because the plurality of the many ultimately rests upon the singularity of the one, in that the essential properties of existence reside within the one, in which all else abides, of which all else comes.
That the singularity of the one is necessary might be demonstrated thusly: as whatsoever begins to exist has a cause, and as the cause of that which begins to exist has a cause, and as an infinite regression of causes is impossible, then some ultimate uncaused cause is the cause of all that which proceeds forth from it, which is all that there is, necessarily. This is due to the fact that it is impossible for there to be an infinite regress. Conversely, consider the fact that should there be an infinite number of causes that cause all else, we might as well consider that infinitude as a finitude of one, since as a limit approaches or approximates unto infinity, it is found to be finite, that is, one.
Prime existence, then, is good and is singular; it is one.
The continuum of good
Firstly, before demonstrating that there is a continuum of good, let us reiterate that there is but one, singular good, which is prime existence: this is the good, of which all other good is. If all other good partakes of the good and there is but one ultimate good, which is singular, then all other good is good in relation to the good, being good in degree; this, too, might comprise an understanding of existence in degrees: while one either exists or does not exist, in one sense; in another sense, that which is not the ultimate good is becoming like unto the ultimate good, bearing in itself the basic existence of being while also becoming.
The continuum of good I derive from the state of affairs obtaining wherein there are various kinds or degrees of good: it is good, for instance, to feed a child who is well-fed, but is it not an even greater good to feed a child who is ill-fed? Or, again, is it good to do that which one believes or intends to be good (though it is, in fact, not)? How much more good, though, it is to do what one believes and intends to be good—and actually is good! There seems to be, then, degrees and kinds of good.
As there cannot be an infinite number of degrees or kinds of good, as there cannot be a true infinity in this reality, so all the goods must approximate unto an ultimate good, even as a limit approaches infinity, it is found to be finite. The good, the highest and most excellent kind of good, must needs be that unto which all other kinds of good conform in some degree or measure, lest we could not know any good as good.
God as the good
The good, being that which is unto which all other kinds of good conform in some way or degree, is singular and is the basic quality of existence, as has been, I hope, heretofore shown. God, though being singular, one, and good, so traditionally qualified, is not hereby shown to exist, simply because I might have demonstrated that there exists evil, good, a continuum of good, the ultimate good, or that reality is basically good. What is shown is that the good and God are very much like each other, so much so that, perhaps, we might call them one and the same.
The sticking point, however, is whether the good is God, that is, is personal, even as God is construed to be personal. I might well argue that the impersonal cannot give rise to the personal, but only the personal to the personal (as well as the impersonal), but I do not know whether this will be found convincing enough; and I wish to stay within the confines of my current flow of argument. Hence, I will argue my argument aforementioned and laid out, namely, that the existence of evil, if it should obtain (which, I hope, I have heretofore demonstrated), presupposes the existence of good, which, if it should obtain, presupposes the existence of a continuum of good, which, if it should obtain, presupposes the existence of the good, which, if it should obtain, presupposes the existence of God. I shall here now, then, demonstrate that the good presupposes the existence of God. I hope that by demonstrating this, I shall then also therewith demonstrate that the existence of evil, presupposing all good in all its states, presupposes the existence of God.
That the good presupposes God
It might well be argued that simply because there is good in the world, that does not thereby indicate that there is God Almighty—even if there should be an ultimate good. For God might as well be Harry Potter, some fictional character construed by the ancients, to mark out the good in the universe, but not to actually correlate with some real entity of reality. Imagine, if you will (with John Lennon), that there is no heaven, no hell, no religion, none of that stuff: only humanity and this good old world. There is good and there is evil, but there is nothing of the sort that religions conjure up: no God, no Satan, no angels, no demons. Reality is fundamentally good, we know from aforementioned arguments, and evil is some parasite or antithetical force of reality, but is not fundamental in reality itself. Evil latches onto the good in reality in some way or another and uses the goodness of reality for its own evil ends.
Now, in this world where there is no God or Satan, it doesn’t take a god or God Almighty to deal with evil; it just takes somebody—anybody will do in this case. Evil, in this godless world, is more like a disease or illness that can be cured with the right antidote or regimen. We, without God in the world, are just as capable of dealing with evil as anybody else; in fact, if God did exist, we might be a bit more adept at dealing with and rooting out evil than he seems to be. We, being in the midst of evil, might understand it all the better, and might have more of an inclination toward urgency in overcoming it, since we understand it so well and live with it so much.
The highest and most noble principle in such a godless world, I suppose, would be human flourishing—or flourishing of life in general; the greatest and most devastating principle, I suppose, might be something like that of death. The question remains, though, if there is no God, by what means do we know the goodness of goodness or the goodness of reality? The godless one might answer, “In terms of myself and what is good for me in particular as well as what is good for others in general.”
Now, this might be a smart way to go, being that “what-is-good-for-me” is a particular state wherein one is vindicated in making such a statement such that what is good for that one in particular, while it may not be good for another, is good for that one; no one can deny that it is good for that person, if to that person, it is good to that one. Now, one might say, “Your smoking is not good for you,” and be quite correct in the matter, but the smoker might say in response, “My smoking is good for me” and give some reason or other as to how the smoking, though detrimental to the lungs and breathing and life and flourishing, is good in terms of calming the smoker’s nerves so that the smoker need not kill him or herself because of the anxiety caused by the nervous nerves.
Indeed, what is so good for me may not be so good for you: all well and good.
The contention might come when I begin to infringe upon what is your own personal standard of goodness. Perhaps, I impose my standard of goodness upon you. In today’s society, this seems, in some sectors, to be far from ever taking place, as everyone in those sectors seems so concerned with being nonjudgmental and non-confrontational, that nothing is ever imposed upon anyone; parents, so far from judging or confronting their children, in these certain sectors, will not raise a hand or voice against their little brats, for fear of being found to be judgmental or confrontational. That is all beside the point, however.
Let us suppose that I begin to infringe upon your standard of goodness. Now, you might consider it good to smoke and I consider it good to kill smokers. As you are going to die already, what difference does it make if it be by means of the cigarette or by my hand? For all is arbitrary and nothing is of any substance or sense.
Indeed, each one of us has inherent meaning and purpose, beyond what we can create for ourselves, but if we cut ourselves off from God, what purpose does anything in our lives have? What purpose does purpose itself have? We might have health, wealth, family, friends, and contentment with all these, but that will be all we have. Furthermore, we might not have any of this or we might well lose it all; and we have, at the end, only ourselves. With or without God in the picture, we have only ourselves at the end of the day, and we must live with whomever we have created ourselves to be.
Now, let us insert God back into this godless world. But before I do, let me demonstrate that there is no meaning or purpose without God: the meaning or purpose that exists in a world without God is all that which has been created by a being without meaning or purpose. But if I should have no meaning or purpose in myself, save for that which I create, then even that meaning which I create is not meaningful, since that which is meaningless (namely, myself) gives rise to that which is meaningless because it cannot give rise to that which is meaningful. A meaningful state or being gives rise to either a meaningful or meaningless state or being, but a meaningless state or being gives rise to only a meaningless state or being, for the meaningless cannot give rise to meaning, in that it lacks meaning.
Now, this sounds strangely like the argument aforementioned that the personal gives rise to the personal as well as the impersonal but that the impersonal only gives rise to the impersonal; and I said I wouldn’t do that. But, as I am writing stream-of-consciously, I cannot be wholly blamed for repeating or reiterating arguments I said I wouldn’t. So, let me try the argument for God from another angle.
God is not only personal and meaningful and purposeful, God is also the supposed sustenance of reality, of being, he himself being Being Itself, the ground of being (as Tillich put it). In short, God might be conceived of as true being. If being is fundamentally good, then God too is good, being Being Itself, the fundamental principle of being, of reality.
Now, evil is a twisting of the state of goodness, thereby being secondary to the good, as it borrows from the good for its existence. But what is good and what is goodness and what is the good? Instances of such might be plentiful, but metaphysically, what is it? Well, previously, I asserted that the good is basically existence or that existence is good, even the good: we cannot have a reality that is at odds with itself, lest we have nothing—since, at present, we have something and we cannot get to something from nothing.
Then, what is this existence, this being? It is that in which we live and move and have our being, as the Apostle Paul says in Acts by Luke. But it originates not from ourselves nor from our ancestors, but, as no infinite regress is possible, from some original originator.
Now, we have goodness, singularity, and an original cause at the head of reality. This might be called God, but as to who or what this is, further thought must be given.
NathanAnthonyBarstad 
Leave a comment